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Individualism is a popular cultural trope in the United States, often touted for 
its promotion of industriousness and rejection of laziness. This essay argues 
that, ironically, America’s brand of individualism actually promotes a more 
fundamental form of the very vice it purports to oppose. To make this case, 
the essay defines the unique form of individualism in the United States and 
then retrieves the classical definition of sloth as a vice against charity (not 
diligence), contrasting Aquinas and Barth with Weber to demonstrate that this 
peculiarly American individualist impulse undermines civic charity by reaping 
the benefits of civic relationships while denying any concomitant responsibili-
ties. Identifying this narrative of individualism as a structural vice, the essay 
proposes structural remedies for reinvigorating civic charity, solidarity, and the 
common good in the United States.
IN THE UNITED STATES, LAZINESS IS A CARDINAL SIN. SIMPLY 
consider contemporary political discourse, which castigates myriad forms of 
laziness under the polemical label of dependency. Behind this indictment lies 
an assumption about the inherent value of industriousness, suggesting that hard 
work and personal dedication are the key to a successful life. In support of this 
presupposition, American culture has been shaped by an individualist ethos 
that characterizes each man or woman as master of his or her own fate. In the-
ory, this rugged individualism creates social incentives for personal diligence, 
thereby undermining the vice of sloth. In practice, however, the idealization 
of this radically independent individual is actually a structural evil promoting 
the more fundamental form of the vice it purports to oppose. To articulate 
and defend this claim, we offer a three-part assessment. The first part outlines 
a distinctive brand of individualism in the United States, establishing the fully 
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autonomous individual as a consistent cultural trope with moral implications. 
The second part explains how this ethos encourages sloth by distinguishing 
sloth as a vice against Max Weber’s Protestant work ethic from its more clas-
sical formulation as a vice against charity. The third part describes how the 
individualist ethos enshrines sloth as a structural vice that can be countered 
with structural remedies to foster charity, solidarity, and the common good. 
The result is a fuller account of the influential role our cultural categories play 
in framing moral discourse and a clearer sense of how to mitigate some of the 
most damaging effects so that we might reinvigorate civic life.
An Individualist Ethos
There is ample reason to assert that an individualist ethos shapes US culture, 
especially when one conceives of individualism broadly as the cultural identifi-
cation of the individual human person as the primary agent in social, political, 
and economic life. This puts individualism in opposition to collectivism, which 
would identify a collective social unit or units (e.g., the nuclear family) as the 
principal agent in social, political, and economic life.1 At this general level, 
studies routinely show that the United States is the most individualist-oriented 
country on the planet, in contrast to much more collectivist-focused nations.2 It 
is no surprise, then, that political scientist Seymour Lipset identified individu-
alism as one of the five central elements of the “American Creed” that makes 
the United States an exceptional (i.e., outlier) nation.3 Thus, a cultural ethos of 
individualism holds a certain pride of place in the United States insofar as this 
is not generally a collectivist nation. Such a description, while accurate, does 
not fully capture the contours of the unique brand of individualism that holds 
sway in the United States. To get a fuller picture of the specifics, one needs 
to appreciate the foundations and evolution of America’s curious blending of 
individualism and moral responsibility.
The case for a distinct form of individualism in the United States begins 
with the Revolution. Admittedly, scholars debate the emergence of a uniquely 
American individualism during this period. On one side, Lipset insists that 
the Revolution gave birth to a political philosophy that prioritized individual 
freedom and rejected external (i.e., governmental) limitations on that freedom; 
on the other side, some historians contend that there were multiple forms of 
individualism and even a few forms of collectivism informing colonial life in 
the late eighteenth century.4 One of the strongest supporters of the latter in-
terpretation is the political philosopher Michael Sandel, who argued in De-
mocracy’s Discontent that the United States has essentially had two competing 
versions of individualism: one aligned with republicanism and popular during 
the revolutionary era, which defended the rights of the individual in order to 
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encourage greater participation in the communal pursuit of the common good, 
and another aligned with procedural liberalism and increasingly popular during 
the twentieth century, which was more concerned with promoting individual 
rights as freedoms from interference rather than as the basis for contributing 
to civic life.5
Sandel’s account is compelling, especially because he acknowledges the pres-
ence and influence of both of these forms of individualism at the birth of the 
United States.6 The historical record bears out his claim, as the political dis-
course of the founders regularly appealed to the republican ideal of individuals 
free from external coercion precisely so that they could participate in collective 
self-governance.7 Contemporary studies have uncovered a late colonial shift 
toward the presumption of individuals as more inherently self-interested and 
thus in need of the procedures of government chiefly to protect their personal 
rights, a view that eventually influenced the development of the Constitution.8 
Hence, it is appropriate to conceive of individualism in the United States as 
one genus with two species, a republican species oriented to civic participation 
and a liberal species oriented to personal freedom.
Tellingly, both of these brands of individualism offer a rational basis for 
the promotion of industriousness, and thus each has a potential contribution 
to make to the fight against sloth. The republican form suggests that personal 
diligence is required to form citizens’ capacities for participation in shared self-
governance. Indeed, proponents of republican individualism touted the im-
portance of civic virtues, arguing that democratic engagement required moral 
formation.9 Consequently, republican individualism touts industriousness at a 
general level, with respect to one’s character development, for slothfulness in 
this area of life would do damage to both the individual and the community. 
Meanwhile, the liberal form of individualism critiques sloth and encourages 
industriousness primarily for the sake of self-sufficiency. In this view, individual 
autonomy is paramount, so a lack of industry is an inherent problem because 
lazy individuals lose their autonomy and have no hope for their own success.10 
These two species of individualism thus propose two distinct accounts of dili-
gence and rejections of sloth. Although they are not mutually exclusive, they 
are different and their differences track, to a degree, with the distinctions sur-
rounding the vice of sloth discussed in the next section.
On its face, this parallel with the competing conceptions of sloth would 
pose a problem for our argument, at the very least undermining our claim that 
individualism in the United States combats one form of sloth while promoting 
another. In truth, however, this would be a problem only if both versions of 
individualism were equally prevalent in our nation’s cultural discourse. While 
both species have in fact persisted over time, their respective influences have 
seldom been the same. Indeed, the individualist ethos in the United States 
has evolved to elevate the liberal version of individualism over its republican 
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counterpart, to the point that only one version of sloth has been the target of 
cultural critique.
Certainly, the seeds of liberal individualism’s success were present in the 
revolutionary period. The Declaration of Independence, for instance, argues 
for insurrection as a means of securing individual liberties. Although the docu-
ment orients these personal rights to a common cause, the bearer of the rights 
in question remains the individual in se. In addition, the document’s echoes 
of John Locke and other social contract thinkers, which emerged during the 
revisions of Jefferson’s original draft, introduce a more liberal notion of the 
individual as inherently unencumbered by even social bonds.11 These seeds 
quickly began to sprout, to the point that one of the earliest observers of the 
fledgling democracy, Alexis de Tocqueville, recorded the prevalence of a dis-
tinctively American individualism “that disposes each citizen to isolate himself 
from the mass of his fellows and to withdraw to the side with his family and his 
friends; so that, after thus creating a small society for his own use, he willingly 
abandons the large society to itself.”12
In fairness, some contemporary scholars challenge the quick equation of 
Tocque ville’s French term, individualisme, with the contemporary version of lib-
eral individualism, arguing that he was in fact describing a rejection of national 
solidarity in favor of links to the local community and not a wholesale renuncia-
tion of all social ties.13 This makes sense, especially in the American context, 
where Tocque ville notes that free elections required aspirants to office to create 
bonds with other citizens in order to succeed.14 Still, the critique is not as power-
ful as its proponents would suggest, for two reasons. First, liberal individualism 
does not deny the existence of social ties, it merely redefines their origin. On this 
point Tocqueville’s individualisme does reflect the shift from a more republican 
form to individualism to a more liberal version because he indicates that Ameri-
can individualism creates voluntary ties “out of ambition” rather than natural 
order.15 Second, even granting the critics’ claim that Tocque ville’s individualisme 
is not identical to contemporary liberal individualism is not a problem, for his 
descriptions still reveal a movement away from republican individualism, a point 
that aligns with the narrative of historical evolution.
Tocqueville’s account of individualism in the early years of the United States 
shows the emergence of a more independence-oriented cultural ethos. Tocque-
ville explains that the United States’ democratic individualism created a class 
of people who believe they “owe nothing to anyone, they expect nothing so 
to speak from anyone; they are always accustomed to consider themselves in 
isolation, and they readily imagine that their entire destiny is in their hands.”16 
This vision of the individual certainly stands in stark contrast to the republican 
notion of an individual with a specific set of civic obligations, but it also lends 
itself to the condemnation of idleness because the logical implication of as-
serting the total control of one’s own destiny is to place the burden of success 
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on the individual alone. The famously popular work of Horatio Alger made 
this connection abundantly clear one generation later. Alger’s “rags to riches 
stories” are intentionally didactic, presenting a way of life that shaped popular 
imagination in the United States after his tales morphed into a form of cultural 
currency idolizing the triumph of self-reliant individuals who owe success to no 
one else.17 As a result, Alger’s name became synonymous with a radically liberal 
brand of individualism that increasingly gained steam in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. Despite its distance from reality, both at Alger’s time 
and since, this simple elision of independence and industry in individualism has 
been a cultural trope of profound significance in the last 150 years, eclipsing its 
republican rival for most of that time.
One major exception to the triumph of the liberal over republican form of 
individualism would seem to be the Great Depression, when dire economic 
circumstances challenged the myth of total personal control over one’s fate. In 
response, communal efforts and government intervention both received wide-
spread support, suggesting the emergence of a more communitarian and less 
individualistic ethos. Such an account of the Great Depression and subsequent 
New Deal policies proceeds too quickly, though, for the New Deal as actually 
enacted evinces the continued persistence of liberal individualism rather than 
a republican resurgence. Precisely because the New Deal championed govern-
ment intervention without reforming the basic structures of the capitalist sys-
tem, it reinforced the economic freedoms of decidedly liberal individuals, both 
presuming and preserving the right of each economic actor to choose what he 
or she saw fit while never orienting that personal discretion to some common 
project.18 Furthermore, once the Depression faded and economic prosperity 
returned, liberal individualism reigned again with explicit force. Consequently, 
even if one accepted a victory for republican individualism in the New Deal, this 
would merely cede the battle without altering the course of the war.19
This history sets the stage for today, when the liberal species of individual-
ism is far more influential than the republican one. In fact, the individualism 
that makes the United States exceptional now is a full-fledged cultural trope 
that shapes our public discourse in politics and beyond. Thus, in the 1980s 
Robert Bellah and his colleagues identified individualism as the “first language” 
of Americans, pointing to a form of “expressive individualism” that encour-
ages individuals to see themselves as set apart from others, pursuing their own 
self-defined goals without any need to envision a common project.20 Certainly, 
contemporary libertarians epitomize this conviction, but the expressive indi-
vidualism described by Bellah and colleagues is not restricted to one corner of 
public life; instead, it is readily apparent in the commonly accepted claim that 
each individual possesses a set of rights that serve as trumps far more than du-
ties, prioritizing nothing more than “the right to be free of others’ demands.”21 
The effects of this trend on civic life are hard to overstate, as Americans are 
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becoming increasingly less invested in civic projects and in the basic building 
blocks of self-governance, eroding social capital and jettisoning the more re-
publican species of individualism.22
For all these reasons, one can legitimately speak of an individualistic ethos 
in the United States that presumes the ideas associated with Alger and in-
sists on the self-sufficiency of the liberal individual to the point that he or she 
has no obligations to the community except for the ones he or she has freely 
 chosen to affirm. A few additional nuances are in order. First, this cultural trope 
is not reducible to the philosophical interpretation of the individual in political 
liberalism. Although they share common roots, the liberal individualism that 
colors popular imagination today represents an extreme distortion of political 
liberalism’s account of the individual, which would not so readily decouple 
freedom and social responsibility.23 Second, the prominence of this species 
of individualism does not imply that everyone in the United States subscribes 
to this vision of the individual. A host of critics representing a wide variety of 
commitments from feminism to communitarianism to conservatism prove that 
this is not so.24 Additionally, some religious groups embody a communitarian 
spirit that rejects the liberal species of individualism and creates communities 
of shared responsibility in its stead.25 Yet, insofar as these alternatives define 
themselves in explicit contrast to, or direct retreat from, the broader culture 
and its individualism, they use that individualism as a foil and thereby confirm 
its prominence as a cultural force.26
Ultimately, the significance of this historical overview lies in the emergence 
of liberal individualism as the first language of public discourse today. By set-
ting the terms of the debate, the current ethos of liberal individualism impacts 
how people approach contested questions as well as how they think about moral 
responsibilities. In this case, the message that each individual is descriptively 
capable of ensuring his or her own success is quickly married to the prescriptive 
implication that he or she has the obligation to work toward that end. Thus, lib-
eral individualism ostensibly counteracts sloth by encouraging industriousness. 
Yet the manner in which this individualist ethos prescribes diligence is inher-
ently problematic, for the idealization of independence masks the realities of 
human interdependence, creating a myth of autonomy that falsely shrinks one’s 
moral responsibilities. As a result, America’s individualistic ethos may oppose 
laziness, but only at the cost of reinforcing sloth. To understand how this is 
possible, one must appreciate an essential distinction in the definition of sloth.
The Distinctions of Sloth
The vice of sloth has a complicated history within Christian ethics and popu-
lar morality. Christian theologians have associated the vice with a range of 
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phenomena, including melancholic sadness, spiritual indifference or sorrow, 
laziness or hyperactivity, and moral apathy. This sense of sloth traces its roots 
back to the ancient monastic concept of acedia or “lack of care.” Monks like 
Evagrius Ponticus saw acedia as a lack of care for God, while others like John 
Cassian thought acedia could keep one from productive labor or encour-
age service as a selfish cure for boredom.27 In short, the classic Christian 
conception of sloth is a vice against love (or charity) with a wide range of 
manifestations.
Popular morality drops the psychological, spiritual, and moral problems 
associated with acedia, and construes sloth more narrowly as the laziness con-
stitutive of a deficient work ethic. The liberal individualist ethos described 
above arguably opposes this secularized form of sloth by praising hard work 
and industriousness. The problem, however, is that the individualistic ethos 
achieves this end by resisting the demands of love, which is a central aspect 
of the classic Christian understanding of sloth. In this manner, the liberal 
individualist ethos ironically enshrines sloth as a structural vice in contempo-
rary America while ostensibly striving to undermine it as a personal one. To 
demonstrate this, it is necessary to consider three sources: Thomas Aquinas, 
Max Weber, and Karl Barth.
For Aquinas, sloth is a vice against charity, the chief theological virtue. Char-
ity unites humans to God in a deep bond of friendship and initiates similar 
friendships with our neighbors.28 Charity does this by shaping character and 
action in a number of respects, three of which are germane to our purposes. 
First, charity shapes joy, a habit of rejoicing in the presence of what one loves.29 
Joy, then, is a social emotion that is shared with friends. Second, charity helps 
one to love God, self, and neighbor in the right order and in the right way. That 
is, charity corrects disproportionate and deficient forms of love, such as disin-
terest in God, excessive self-love, and hatred of others.30 Third, charity makes 
one zealous for God and neighbor. A zealous person voluntarily promotes the 
good of others and works to remove obstacles or hindrances to their good.31 
Together these dispositions inspire the various works of charity, which include 
making peace in a divided society, showing mercy, serving others, and sharing 
with those in need.32
Sloth opposes charity in each of these respects and fosters a number of 
harmful dispositions. As an “oppressive sorrow,” about spiritual good, a sloth-
ful person is joyless because he or she perceives the good as evil, and so has 
nothing to celebrate.33 A joyless person can become sad and despondent, and 
retreat from relationships.
Sloth also disorders love. By mistaking the good for evil, it becomes hard 
to love, for nothing is desirable or interesting, not even God, the supreme 
good. This does not mean that all slothful people are resigned to total in-
difference though. Since humans are naturally drawn to the good and seek 
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happiness, some slothful people vainly attempt to find total satisfaction in 
created things rather than in God.34 The result of this search, however, is 
that sloth makes one unhappy, and unhappy people can become spiteful or 
malicious rather than loving. One in the grips of spite or malice may engage 
in all sorts of combative behaviors and thereby tear the fabric that binds 
social relations.
Finally, sloth curbs zeal, for one becomes weary of work and has no interest 
in doing good deeds to benefit others.35 Sloth, therefore, fosters sluggishness 
or greed for self-gain, both of which can harm or erode relationships.36 For 
example, one engrossed in achievement at work may neglect spending time with 
one’s partner or children. Importantly, then, hard work can be an expression of 
sloth, as it may be motivated by any number of things, including a desire to cure 
boredom, dominate others, or acquire goods so that others do not enjoy them.
Aquinas holds that by keeping one from rejoicing in God and the good of 
the neighbor, sloth refuses to love and do the works of charity. As a result, sloth 
neglects the daily actions that sustain bonds of affection between friends and 
other neighbors.37 It is clear that sloth has a number of psychological, spiritual, 
and moral effects for Aquinas.
Popular conceptions, on the other hand, equate sloth almost exclusively 
with laziness. Max Weber’s “Protestant work ethic” is perhaps the single most 
influential account of this view, as it indicates modern industriousness as the 
counterpart of sloth. Weber suggests that Calvinism developed the view that 
God created humans to glorify God by obeying God’s commandments, one 
of which is a command to work.38 Weber’s characterization of this Reformed 
conception of sloth has two results.
First, sloth rejects the basic demands of God’s covenant. Weber writes, 
“Waste of time is thus the first and in principle the deadliest of sins. . . . Loss of 
time through sociability, idle talk, luxury, even more sleep than is necessary for 
health . . . is worthy of absolute moral condemnation. . . . [Time] is infinitely 
valuable because every hour lost is lost to labour for the glory of God.”39 The 
“spirit of capitalism” that emerges from this position affirms the “self-made 
man” as its ethical exemplar; this person opposes sloth by working diligently 
in response to God’s calling and thereby fulfills the commands to glorify God 
and love the neighbor.40 Second, sloth reflects a lack of faith that calls one’s 
standing as a member of God’s elect into question. Given God’s transcendence 
and inscrutable will, the best way to be assured that one is in fact a member of 
God’s elect is by demonstrating faith through work.41 Weber states: “However 
useless good works might be as a means of attaining salvation . . . nevertheless, 
they are indispensable as a sign of election. . . . In practice this means that God 
helps those who help themselves.”42 Hard work, therefore, gives glory to God, 
demonstrates faith in God, and avoids the vice of sloth.
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The strength of this Weberian version of the Reformed perspective is that 
it takes sloth seriously and devotes substantial theological and ethical attention 
to it. The weakness of this view—which Weber acknowledges—is its failure to 
grapple with the ways in which hard work can promote an isolated individual-
ism that reflects deficient love of God, self, and neighbor.
This problem is especially clear today in light of the ways in which the liberal 
individualist ethos has secularized the concepts of hard work and sloth. Hard 
work is no longer the primary means of giving God glory and ensuring one’s 
election; rather, it has become a way to secure individual well-being. Enjoying 
the fruits of labor is the ultimate incentive to diligence. Those who are slothful, 
however, gain nothing and are owed nothing. Lack of industry is their problem, 
not failing to obey God. In this way, liberal individualism’s secularizing effects 
mirror Weber’s own sense that the “religious roots” of the spirit of capitalism 
have “died out,” leaving “sober economic virtue” and “utilitarian worldliness” 
in their place.43
This secularization of sloth has the unfortunate consequence of reinforcing 
a brand of individualism that refuses the demands of love and relationship. 
Karl Barth’s account of sloth demonstrates this connection even more em-
phatically. Barth views sloth as the human rejection of God’s reconciling grace 
that elevates human beings from the effects of sin.44 As such, sloth is a form of 
hate that prefers isolated existence apart from the relationships with God and 
neighbor that constitute human nature.45 For Barth, then, the characteristic 
feature of liberal individualism—namely, the right to be free from the demands 
of others46—is actually best seen as the sin of sloth. This is why Barth calls sloth 
“graceless being for ourselves.”47
The logic undergirding this connection of sloth and individualism is  relatively 
straightforward. Human beings were made for fellowship with God and neigh-
bor; by rejecting this fellowship, we curve inward on ourselves and become hos-
tile to the claims of others and their demands on us. Barth likens the slothful 
person to a hedgehog who has rolled into a ball with “prickly spikes” that threaten 
others.48 This hostility is evident in a range of dispositions and behaviors. Among 
other things, slothful individuals are characterized by excessive or deficient self-
respect, by total disinterest in activity or work, by workaholic striving for indi-
vidual gain, and by disordered relationships with God and neighbor.49
Barth critiques the ideal of “conscientious work” on the grounds that it 
refuses to rest in God’s promises and gracious acts.50 In fact, Barth argues 
that leisure affirms that God is in control and so is “far superior in dignity” to 
workaholism, which promotes self-mastery and self-sufficiency.51 The ethos of 
individualism therefore rejects grace because it is free, not earned. Seen in this 
light, the workaholism and laziness of sloth are mirror images of one another: 
both avoid relationship and obligations to God.
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Moreover, a society composed of slothful individuals experiences a range of 
social effects that are highly reminiscent of the structural evils present in our 
own day. Barth specifically notes that sloth gives rise to callous indifference, 
racism and xenophobia, increasing competitiveness, excessive consumption, the 
desire for total security from threats, and a willingness to use violence to achieve 
one’s ends.52 For example, if one can expect nothing from one’s neighbors, it is 
plausible to construe them as potential enemies that need to be defeated. For-
eigners and those of other races are also seen as threatening, so violence, exclu-
sion, and oppression become attractive means to monopolize social benefits and 
secure one’s property. Those in the grips of these thoughts often struggle with 
anxiety and fear, and so are not free to live an unencumbered life. Barth claims 
that each of these social effects stem from sloth’s divestment of relationship in 
favor of individualistic existence.
In these respects, Barth expresses a conception of sloth that is similar to 
Aquinas’s vice against charity.53 Sloth shapes harmful dispositions in individuals 
and can be seen in social structures that promote an individualistic impulse that 
rejects God and neighbor.
This brief historical survey allows us to draw two conclusions. First, lib-
eral individualism and sloth reflect an atomistic anthropology that opposes 
charity. The individualist ethos seeks protection of individual rights while 
limiting social duties and responsibilities. Similarly, sloth curbs love and zeal 
and makes us indifferent to relating with and assisting others. In contrast, 
Aquinas affirms a social anthropology on which humans were created for 
friendship with God and neighbor and so have duties to promote the com-
mon good, which secures the well-being of each individual and society as a 
whole.54 Charity pursues the common good, while liberal individualism and 
sloth refuse this.
Second, the individualist ethos and the vice of sloth are actually product and 
producer of one another. Barth argues that individualism and sloth foster social 
structures of competition, dominance, exclusion, and harm. These structures 
in turn shape individuals who seek self-sufficiency and security on their own 
terms and act in ways that sustain harmful structures. Ironically, the ethos of 
individualism and hard work ordered to individual gain perpetuates a set of 
social circumstances that fracture society and cause sloth.
In summary, sloth rejects relationship and the civic demands of charity, 
much like the liberal brand of isolated individualism. Indeed, as this account 
of sloth reveals, the values of the reigning form of liberal individualism that 
pervades contemporary culture are precisely the values promoted by the vice 
of sloth itself. One can rightly indict this cultural trope as a form of sloth, and 
this, in effect, makes sloth a peculiarly powerful structural vice in the United 
States today. In the final section of our essay, we elaborate on this point, 
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specifying the ways in which the ethos of liberal individualism embodies sloth 
as a structural vice so that we can then employ this category to propose viable 
structural remedies.
Sloth as America’s Structural Vice
While there are a number of terms to identify social structures with nega-
tive moral impacts (e.g., structural sin, structural evil, structural violence, and 
structural vice), we opt to use “structural vice” because we focus on sloth and 
retrieve its classical definition as a capital vice. This language highlights what 
is at stake in the case of sloth and the United States’ individualist ethos, which 
is first and foremost an impact on dispositions and only then an impact on ac-
tions. Naturally, an emphasis on dispositions is consistent with the concept of 
virtue, but it also aligns with the more particular notion of a structure of vice 
as articulated by Daniel Daly, who argues that “structures of vice are the social 
structures that in some way consistently function to prevent the human good, 
the common good, and human happiness.”55 Significantly, in identifying the 
social structures that might become structures of vice, Daly lists “a value laden 
narrative” alongside three other examples.56 Given that the American ethos of 
individualism is a value-laden narrative valorizing a form of isolation and self-
concern that amounts to the vice of sloth in its Thomistic and Barthian formu-
lations, it is a structure of vice violating each of Daly’s key areas of assessment.
First, the narrative of liberal individualism suggests that each person is suf-
ficient on his or her own, both generating and supporting a form of sloth that 
resists the demands of love by denying the very existence of relationships in the 
first place, to say nothing of their responsibilities. This frustrates the human 
good, especially as that good is conceived in theological terms, for Christians 
argue that the example of Christ shows that the true nature of the human good 
lies in kenotic service to others.57 Given this conviction, a cultural ethos that 
encourages people to view themselves as closed off from others, like Barth’s 
prickly hedgehog, certainly amounts to a structural form of sloth that under-
mines the human good.
Second, the narrative of liberal individualism also undermines the common 
good. By reinforcing the notion that each individual is entirely the master of 
his or her own fate, this cultural trope downplays the many ways in which our 
well-being depends on shared public goods. A classic example would be the 
environment, for the car-centric economy of the United States is designed 
around a desire for immediate access to transportation on our own schedules 
despite the fact that an excessive reliance on automobiles seriously harms the 
environment. In contrast, more collectivist societies in Europe have embraced 
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an intentionally sustainable infrastructure built around public transit, which 
literally forces individuals to share a common space and schedule.58 Whereas we 
have prioritized personal convenience over collective benefit—in keeping with 
our individualist ethos—those in collectivist societies have accepted a degree 
of individual inconvenience for the sake of a shared benefit; they have put the 
common good ahead of private, personal gain. In theory, we might do the same, 
but in truth, such personal sacrifices require an awareness of one’s place within 
a broader community. Sadly, this connection is exactly what the slothful narra-
tive of liberal individualism masks. By promoting self-love and corrupting the 
order of charity, this structural vice leaves the individual focused on maximizing 
personal gain regardless of social costs, a process that undermines the common 
good not only by facilitating the destruction of public goods but also by eroding 
participation in communal life more generally.
Finally, the cultural trope of liberal individualism frustrates human hap-
piness as well. By suggesting a moral obligation to ensure one’s own success 
exclusively, the narrative of liberal individualism values relationships in solely 
utilitarian terms. This slothful rejection of charity harms the human happiness 
of those who are used for utilitarian ends, since their personal needs are subor-
dinated to an agent’s self-interested aims. Just as importantly, this form of sloth 
harms the human happiness of the agent as well. The basis for this claim lies 
in empirical work, primarily in psychology and economics, which has demon-
strated that human happiness is most powerfully affected by “relational goods,” 
not by financial or other material goods. Relational goods are the benefits that 
arise from relationships and other social connections, and, significantly, the 
strongest of these benefits are tied to “non-instrumental social interaction.”59 
There is also a theological parallel for this observation, as the relational anthro-
pology of a human being made in the image and likeness of the Holy Trinity 
suggests a natural affinity (and thus eudaimonistic fittingness) for relationships, 
especially relationships in which the inherent distinctiveness of each party is 
affirmed for its own sake.60 In both empirical and theological terms, then, the 
slothfulness of our liberal individualist ethos frustrates human happiness.
The narrative of liberal individualism is laden with the values of the vice of 
sloth, and through those values this narrative “function[s] to prevent the human 
good, the common good, and human happiness.”61 As such, we are confident in 
our diagnosis of liberal individualism—and, by association, sloth—as a struc-
tural vice. This diagnosis provides a useful basis for constructing a solution 
because the twofold description of the individualist ethos as a structure and a 
vice indicates that the problem will best be countered by structures that pro-
mote opposing virtues. Although there are a number of structures that could 
be well suited to this task, church communities are especially valuable since 
moral formation is a central part of their mission. Given what has been said 
above about religious communities’ existing efforts to create alternatives to 
JSCE_37-2_BOOK.indb   128 11/30/17   6:38 PM
 Christopher D. Jones and Conor M. Kelly    •    129
America’s unique individualist ethos, the way churches go about this task will 
be particularly important. If the structures of vice in American society are going 
to be transformed, churches will need to promote their alternative visions as 
reforms within rather than retreats from the broader culture of individualism. 
Furthermore, these communities will need to harness their power as agents 
of collective action, providing the structural supports to encourage personal 
formation not just in virtue generally but also in the specific virtues that can 
oppose sloth in its structural forms. While the well-documented rise of the 
“Nones” suggests that religious communities will face an uphill battle in this 
project, churches that embrace their structural role might actually appeal to the 
large portion of the unaffiliated that still openly longs for community, thereby 
extending the reach of the alternative vision.62 At the same time, the effects of 
a church’s structural reforms should expand beyond its members anyway, so the 
success of this project does not hinge exclusively on religious affiliation. Given 
the importance of this task and the real opposition it will face, we would like 
to close by proposing two essential virtues for this type of structural reform.63
Since sloth is, in the classical formulation retrieved here, a vice against char-
ity, charity itself offers a helpful corrective to sloth’s structural instantiations 
because this virtue can be used to establish a counternarrative and an alterna-
tive structure to effects of liberal individualism. First, charity directly addresses 
the myth of self-sufficiency by reminding us that “We love because God first 
loved us” (1 John 4:19). In the words of Pope Benedict XVI, “Charity in truth 
places [us] before the astonishing experience of gift,” and “because it is a gift 
received by everyone, charity in truth is a force that builds community,” bring-
ing people together with a shared narrative of inherent interdependence.64 
Second, charity also directs the individual away from exclusive self-concern by 
introducing a proper ordering of love that necessarily acknowledges not only 
God but also the neighbor whom God also loves.65 As Eric Gregory has artfully 
demonstrated, this understanding of charity is not some parochial tool exclusive 
to Christians but a helpful category for the revitalization of civic commitment 
in a pluralistic context and thus a corrective to the isolated individualism of our 
preferred cultural trope and peculiar structural vice.66 Finally, charity is ori-
ented to structural reform. Martin Luther King Jr. made this abundantly clear 
sixty years ago when he spoke of “the beloved community” as the end game of 
the civil rights movement, suggesting that it was the love of God, agape, that 
would inform the restoration of a just and equitable society.67 Significantly, 
King also argued that this love directs our attention to “the unjust system, 
rather than the individuals who are caught in that system.”68 With this claim, 
King points toward charity as a structural virtue capable of motivating actions 
targeted at systemic change without turning anyone into an enemy. In all three 
of these ways, then, charity indicts the divisive narrative of absolute autonomy 
and exclusive self-concern that turned sloth into America’s ironic structural vice 
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while simultaneously creating the dispositions for a renewed sense of shared 
commitment and mutual concern in civic life.
Beyond the restoration of charity, another promising project is recovering 
the virtue of solidarity and the ethos of the common good. John Paul II affirms 
that solidarity “is not a feeling of vague compassion or shallow distress at the 
misfortunes” of others but “a firm and persevering determination to commit 
oneself to the common good.”69 Solidarity, then, is a virtuous disposition that 
recognizes human interdependence and seeks the well-being of each person 
and society as a whole. Churches and social groups that promote solidarity and 
the common good will provide additional correctives to the selfish and isola-
tionist tendencies of sloth and liberal individualism by advocating for justice 
and peace.70 Interestingly, liberal individualism arose in part as a response to 
the common good tradition, which came to be seen as a tyrannical imposition 
of a single vision of the good life on a pluralistic society.71 Nevertheless, there 
are ways to promote the common good that are pluralistic and integrationist, 
not monolithic and authoritarian. For example, Rabbi Jonathan Sacks argues 
against cultural paternalism, where all must assimilate to the dominant culture, 
and liberal multiculturalism, where there is dignity in difference but everyone 
ought to be left alone, and instead affirms the goal of establishing the com-
mon good though collaborative service projects.72 By working together, Sacks 
contends that individuals and social groups can retain their distinct identities 
while forging common bonds and nurturing relationships. Such collaboration 
also develops dispositions of civil deliberation and charitable interpretation, 
which can sustain dialogue that reveals common ground.73 Thus, the ethos 
of the common good fosters just dealings between persons, inspires institu-
tions and communities of social action that promote shared benefits, and strives 
for the just distribution of these benefits so that everyone in society enjoys 
them.74 Consequently, a society ordered to the common good is characterized 
by friendship and the virtue of solidarity rather than suspicion, conflict, and the 
desire to be free from responsibilities.
By renewing charity and solidarity and by nurturing a commitment to the 
common good, religious communities and other structures can counteract the 
various harms associated with sloth and liberal individualism. It follows that 
the structural defense of love and service of God and others—not hard work 
ordered to individual gain—are the true remedies of the structural vice of sloth.
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